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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONTEsMPT-EvIENC-In an original proceeding before the Supreme
Court against respondent for contempt, he was found guilty and sentenced.
A motion and a petition are now brought before the court. The motion, by
the state, is to modify the judgment for inadequate sentence, because
evidence is alleged to have been found to the effect that respondent
attempted to get certain persons of great political influence to interfere
and to talk to the personnel of the court in his behalf while the original
proceeding was still pending. The petition, by respondent, is for a re-
hearing of his motion for new trial, on the ground that inadmissible
depositions were allowed in evidence. Hold: Motion overruled; petition
denied. This is not a criminal proceeding in the sense that the rules of
evidence for criminal cases apply. Depositions of witnesses residing in
foreign jurisdictions are admissible. State v. Shoemaker, Ind. S. Ct., 162
N. E. 441.
Although it is now pretty soundly established that the power to punish
summarily for indirect contempt is not inherent in our courts, Sir John
Fox, The History of Contempt of Court, and III Ind. L. Journ. 751, still
the courts have so long considered this power inherent and incapable of
being taken from them that, for all practical purposes, the power is
inherent. In re Debs, 15 U. S. 564, at 594, 595, 15 S. Ct. 900, at 910, 39
L. Ed. 1092, Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 780, at 782.
The court holds that contempt is not a crime, and the holding seems to be
right. The court procedure governing contempt cases was not developed
along with the criminal law, but as a separate branch of the law for the
protection of the court in its proper functioning. Jury trial is not required
in contempt cases as in trials of crimes, Garrigus v. State, 93 Ind. 239,
24 Cyc. 146; and, as in the present case, not all rules of criminal evidence
are enforced, O'Neil v. The People, 113 IlL A. 195.
This case suggests the question of whether or not contempts are within
executive pardoning power. If they are not crimes, but mere offenses
against the court, it would seem that the executive branch of government
has no power over them. But the Supreme Court of the United States
has decided contra, Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 45 S. Ct. 332, 69
L. Ed. 527, 38 A. L. R. 131. D. J.
CORPORATIONS-EsTOPPEL---PROPER PARTY.-A corporation was organ-
ized with appellants as incorporators. Articles of incorporation were
drawn up and filed with the secretary of state, the fee was paid and charter
granted. The corporation thereupon contracted with the appellees who
undertook to purchase all of its preferred stock. Appellees then required
the corporation to deposit $25,000 with a bank as guaranty of performance
of the contract which was signed by Sterne as president with authority of
appellants as board of directors. The corporation found it was impossible
to sell even one-fourth of the common stock it proposed to issue, and so
could not pay into the treasury one-fourth of the subscription price. Appel-
lants then bring action against appellees for recovery of the $25,000
deposited, less any costs of the transaction. Held: Appellants as indi-
viduals cannot claim a right under the contract so as to maintain this
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action. Sterne et al. v. Fletcher American Co. et aL Appellate Court of
Indiana, May 11, 1928. 161 N. E. 580.
This case involves an interesting interpretation of the Indiana law
governing incorporation. When, under the statute, does a corporation come
into existence as such and when may it assume all the rights and privileges
incident to it? Burns' Ann. Statutes, Sec. 4826, provides that articles of
incorporation may be filed with the secretary of state, who shall issue a
certificate certifying that the corporation as named in the articles is
authorized to do business. But Burns' Sec. 4842 requires that a corporation
shall have no rights or privileges as such until one-fourth of the capital
stock has been subscribed and one-fourth of subscription price paid into
the treasury. If in the present case the latter statute entirely precluded
corporate existence, then the corporation would have no capacity to bring
action on any contract. Yet it is generally held a corporation comes into
existence upon substantially complying with the statute requiring filing of
articles and issuance of the certificate by the secretary of state. 22 A.L.
R. 394; Atherton v. Sugar Creek & P. Turnpike Co., 67 Ind. 334; Chieppo
v. Chieppo, 90 Atl. 940. Under like statutes in other states it has been
held that upon receiving certificate, a corporation is allowed to obtain
necessary subscriptions to stock, but it must not transact business with
other than stockholders until the requirement of having a certain amount
of stock subscribed is met. Standard Drilling Co. v. Slate, 226 S. W. 377.
The requirement is therefore a condition subsequent and not a condition
precedent to corporate existence. 14 C. J. 154.
The appellants here bring the action as individuals on the theory that
since one-fourth of the stock of the association was not subscribed to, the
association had no rights or privileges as a corporation. However, appel-
lants, if they contracted at all with appellees, did so through the corpora-
tion. In some cases contracts entered into even before the filing of arti-
cles of incorporation were held to be enforceable, the parties being estopped
to deny corporate power when the contract was entered into assuming cor-
porate power. Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392. Also, persons contract-
ing with organizations as corporations can not deny their legal corporate
existence at the date of the contract, if there is no fraud. Bradford v.
Frankfort, 142 Ind. 383; Clark v. American Coal Co., 35 Ind. App. 73.
The contract here was in the nature of a subscription to stock and was
between the corporation and appellees who were to become stockholders,
appellants being but directors of the corporation. Having acted through
the corporation, they are not now proper parties to an action arising
out of that contract, and are so estopped to deny corporate existence. Fol-
lowing the majority of the authorities, the corporation would have capacity
sufficient to enter into such contract as this covering the guaranty along
with the subscription of stock, so an action arising out of that contract
could be properly brought by the corporation only, it being an entirely
distinct entity from the appellants as incorporators or directors.
C. W. D.
CRIMINAL L*W-APPrAL FROM JUsTice'S COURT-EFFECT OF AMIEND-
MENT TO STATTE.-Appellant, having been convicted of a misdemeanor in
the city court of Decatur, fined, and sentenced to six months' confinement,
prayed an appeal to the circuit court of Adams county and filed an appeal
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bond, with proper sureties, which bond was approved by the court. The
special judge dictated and prepared the bond, at the request of appellant
or her attorney. The transcript on appeal, however, was not prepared or
filed in the circuit court, and this action in mandamus was brought against
appellee, special judge in the city court, to compel him to prepare and
file it. He answered by general denial and the trial court found in his
favor. The appellant assigned as error the overruling of the appellant's
motion for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was not sustained
by sufficient evidence. Held: Judgment reversed, with directions to the
trial court to grant the motion for a new trial. State ex rel. Ladd vs.
Walters, 162 N. E. 444.
This case may be taken as the interpretation of the Indiana Supreme
Court of sections 2111 and 2113, Burns' Ann. St., 1926, as amended by
Acts of 1927, c. 132, sections 1 and 3. In its original form, section 2111
(Acts of 1905, c. 169, section 81) provided in simple words for an appeal
from a judgment of a justice of the peace to the criminal or circuit court
of the county, within ten days after such judgment; and, "in case such
prisoner enters into recognizance for his appearance at the next term
of such court, such appeal shall stay all further proceedings." In the
amended form (Acts of 1927, c. 132, section 1) the statute now reads "In
case such prisoner enters into recognizance * ** and causes to be filed in
such court, within fifteen days, all other papers, documents and transcripts
necessary to complete his appeal, such appeal shall stay further proceed-
ings," etc. Section 2113 (Acts of 1905, c. 169, section 83) before amend-
ment, provided that "such recognizance, together with a transcript of the
proceedings, and all papers in the case, shall be forthwith filed by the
justice with the clerk of the proper court. In the amended form (Acts
of 1927, c. 132, section 3) the words "by the justice" are omitted alto-
gether. Appellee's contention was that the added words in Section 2111,
and the ommission of the words "by the justice" in Section 2113, made it
obligatory upon appellants to prepare and file their transcripts themselves,
and relieved justices, mayors, and judges of city courts of any duty in the
matter. This view the Supreme Court expressly denies.
As the appellee points out in his brief, it is a logical presumption that
the motive of the makers of the amendments herein concerned was a de-
sire to relieve the magistrates of these courts of limited jurisdiction from
the burden of making transcripts in unimportant cases without remunera-
tion, or even perhaps for the purpose of discouraging appeals in petty
cases tried in these courts. Appeals in such cases are known to be, more
often than not, trivial and contentious; prosecuted not so much as an honest
effort to obtain any full measure of justice denied in a lower court, as an at-
tempt to put an end to the whole transaction, and effectively prevent the
very rehearing of the case which the appeal ostensibly demands. The Su-
preme Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the preparation of transcripts
and other papers for appeal is a burden on the court concerned. In practice
it often works out that an appeal drops the whole proceedings into oblivion,
and a guilty defendant escapes justice by the artifice of throwing upon
the court that convicted him the further task of preparing his (the
defendant's) own case for appeal. Parenthetically, it may be remarked
that in no other kind of court is the party found against excused from
preparing his own papers on appeal.
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The decision seems to leave the matter exactly as it was before the
amendments were passed (with the probable exception that the new
statute still hastens the time for trying such appeal); and upon the refusal
of a justice, mayor or judge of a city court to prepare transcripts and other
papers for appeal, he may be compelled by mandamus to do so. State ez
rel. Jacoby vs. Cressinger (1883), 88 Ind. 499; Yager vs. State (1920),
190 Ind. 550. In view of the abuse of the privilege of appeal from petty
courts, the Legislature might well consider giving the statutes concerned
a thorough overhauling, placing the duty of preparing the appeal squarely
upon the party desiring it, in direct and unmistakable language, interpre-
tation of which need not be left to any implication or construction of
added or omitted words.
H. C.
LARCENY-JURISDICTION-WITNESsES - CRIMINAL LAW - PROSECUTION
FOR GRAND LARcNY.-Defendant charged with unlawfully, and feloniously
taking and carrying away goods from one county into another. Defendant
prosecuted in county into which he took goods. Question of jurisdiction in
the court of the latter county raised but was held against defendant. De-
fendant's motion to quash affidavit overruled. Defendant was asked on
cross-examination concerning an arrest and was made to answer his objec-
tion. Defendant assigns as error the overruling of motions to quash and
for a new trial, on the ground that he should have been made to answer
concerning the arrest. Tosser v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, June
19, 1928, 162 N. E. 49.
Bill of Rights, Burns Ann. Stat. 1926, Act 65, provides that: In all
criminal prosecution accused should have right to public trial by an im-
partial jury in county in which offense shall have been committed. Since
early English history it has been settled that one stealing goods in one
county might be indicted for larceny in any other county into which he car-
ried the goods, on the theory that possession of goods by the thief is a
larceny of the goods in every county into which he carried the goods, be-
cause the legal possession remains in the owner and every moment's con-
tinuance of felony amounts to a new caption. This is well settled in U. S.
17 R. C. L., p. 45; Martin v. State, 176 Ind. 317. Burns 1926 Ann. Stat.
Sec. 2039 expressly provides that: When property taken in one county
by larceny has been brought into another county, the jurisdiction is in either
county. It is interesting to note also that to have grand larceny the goods
stolen must be of one hundred dollars value or more instead of twenty-five
dollars as required by Sec. 2451 Burns 1926. See 1927 Acts of Ind., Chap.
203, sec. 4.
Wigmore, Sec. 982, criticizes the admission by some courts, of the
question on cross-examination concerning a previous arrest, on ground
that it casts a suspicion on witness. Courts should understand that the
only relevant circumstance is the actual conduct, i. e., the fact, not the
charge of having misbehaved. Indiana, however, follows the rule that
permits the question as to previous arrests, convictions, etc., within the
discretion of the court and It does not appear here that the discretion was
abused. Parker v. State, 136 Ind. 284; Vancleave v. State, 150 Ind. 273;
Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51; Owen v. State, 148 Ind. 401. Denny v. State,
190 Ind. 76, was a case of larceny of automobile tires and there a question
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was allowed on cross examination concerning an indictment for liquor vio-
lation. Exclusive possession of property by defendant immediately after
commission of alleged crime, if unexplained by the defendant, raises a pre-
sumption that he is the thief. Isenhour 1. State, 157 Ind. 517; Madden v.
State, 148 Ind. 183; Campbell v. State, 150 Ind. 74; Johnson v. State, 148
Ind. 522; Rosenberg v. State, 134 N. E. 856. Defendant may rebut the
presumption and if on the whole evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as
to accused's guilt he should be acquitted. Blake v. State, 130 Ind. 203;
Mason v. State, 171 Ind. 78. A. L. B.
LIENS-CHATTFM MORTGAGES-RECORDNG.--Plaintiffs seek to enforce an
alleged equitable lien as against defendants, trustee for certain creditors
and committee for certain creditors of John Totten and Frank Totten. It
appears that the Tottens on October 16, 1925, obtained a loan of $3,938.86
from the Thompson State Bank, to enable them to purchase certain cattle.
The Tottens gave their promissory note for the above sum, due in six
months. At the same time and as a part of the above transaction, an
agreement, denominated a '%ill of sale" was executed by the said Tottens,
covering 157 head of cattle, being the cattle paid for with the money loaned.
The "bill of sale," however, recited that it was given to the bank as a
pledge to secure the payment of the note. This agreement was not re-
corded. The note was, before maturity, duly indorsed by the bank to plain-
tiffs. In February, 1926, the Tottens entered into an agreement with a
committee for the creditors of said Tottens, whereby the latter conveyed to
Williams as trustee for certain named creditors "and such other creditors
as should come in and accept such agreement" certain property including
the cattle covered by the bill of sale to the bank. As a part of the consider-
ation for this assignment the committee acting for the creditors agreed that
the creditors would exempt certain designated property from their claims
and would forbear to sue for any unpaid balance after distribution of assets
coming into trustee's hands. Plaintiffs declined to join in the settlement
but sue upon the bill of sale. The cattle were never in the possession of
either the bank or the plaintiffs. Lower court held for defendants and
plaintiffs appeal. Held: That the bill of sale was a chattel mortgage and
that appellants, not recording the mortgage, can not assert their lien as
against creditors giving valuable consideration for assignment by mortga-
gor for their benefit, in absence of showing that they had notice of thc
mortgage lien. Powell et al. v. Totten et al., Appellate Court of Indiana,
July 26, 1928, 162 N. E. 418.
A party may by agreement create a charge in the nature of a lien on
his property which a court of equity will enforce as an equitable lien
against him and volunteers or claimants under him with notice of the
agreement. An agreement by which the maker incurs an obligation and
pledges the property as security for performance creates such an equitable
lien. 17 R. C. L. 604, sec. 13; Ketchum v. St. Louis, 101 U. S. 306; Walker
v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654; Farmers Loan, etc., Co. v. Pexn Plate Glass Co.,
103 Fed. 132; Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581. Although the instrument here
was called a "bill of sale", it expressly stipulated that it was given as
security for the payment of the money borrowed, hence it was simply a
chattel mortgage, even as between the parties. If intended to secure an
obligation, then the instrument, irrespective of its form or letter, must be
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construed to be a mortgage. Maynord v. Shaw, (Pa.) 92 Atl. 204; Harris
v. Nixon, I Howard 118; Shillober v. Robinson, 97 U. S. 68; 19 R. C. L.
sec. 7. Sec. 8055 Burns' 1926, provides, in substance, that no assignment
of goods by way of mortgage shall be valid against any other person than
the parties thereto, where such goods are not deliverd to th mortgagee, or
assignee, and retained by him, unless such assignment or mortgage is
recorded. In the present case the mortgage was not recorded, the creditors
had no notice of the bank's lien, and furthermore the creditors were not
volunteers. Therefore under the above well established rules of law and
under the Indiana statute, the appellants can not assert their lien against
the creditors. Wolf v. Russell et al., 55 Ind. App. 660; Ames Iron Workg v.
Warren et al., 76 Ind. 512; Briggs v. Fleming et al., 112 Ind. 313; Scorry
v. Bennett, 2 Ind. App. 167. H. C. L.
